The literature on parliamentary war powers has focused on the veto rights of legislatures. This case study on the Finnish Eduskunta adopts a more comprehensive approach. Based on parliamentary documents and statistics, it reconstructs parliamentary involvement in decision-making on individual crisis management operations, laws on crisis management, and 'grand strategy' documents since the mid-1990s. The findings underscore the importance of politicization, with conflicts over legislation and the Government Security and Defence Policy Reports enabling political parties and the Eduskunta to set parameters for subsequent decisions on individual operations. The politicization of crisis management facilitated stronger participation rights for the Eduskunta and created 'ownership' of troop deployments among MPs. Debates have nonetheless become less intense, with broader crossparty support for participation in crisis management and for EU-led operations in particular.
Europe (OSCE). Out of the Nordic countries this adaptation was arguably hardest for Finland, a militarily non-aligned country for whom good relations with Russia have understandably been a top priority. (Vesa, 2007; Stamnes, 2007; Jakobsen, 2006) This changing security context forms the starting point of this article, which examines the role of the Eduskunta, the unicameral legislature, in national decision-making on crisis management. As outlined in the introductory article to this Special Issue (Mello and Peters, 2017) , previous literature on parliaments and security policy has for the most part focused on executive-legislative relations and on tracing the impact of parliamentary involvement. Scholars have paid less attention to the debating function of parliaments in security matters and how such politicization is related to government scrutiny. In the post-Cold War era there are good reasons to expect more debate and ideological contestation about crisis management and 'wars of choice', both regarding what operations countries participate in and in what capacity (Raunio and Wagner, 2017b) . Hence this article addresses the question outlined in the introductory article: 'when parliaments become involved in security policydoes this foster transparency and contribute to the politicization of security policy so that security policy becomes a "normal" political issue? ' (Mello and Peters, 2017) The article emphasizes legislatures as a site for politicization of security policy, showing that partypolitical conflicts over crisis management facilitated stronger opportunity structures for parliamentary engagement in troop deployments in Finland. Analysing the parliamentary processing of all individual operations, laws on crisis management, and national 'grand strategy' documents from 1995 to 2016, it shows that there is clearly a sense of 'ownership' of crisis management among Finnish MPs, with troop deployments and the operations subject to close parliamentary scrutiny. The main causal argument of this article is thus that politicization of crisis management brings about stronger parliamentary accountability of the government. Essentially crisis management has become part of normal parliamentary politics, with the Eduskunta receiving information from the government and organizing committee hearings and plenary debates exactly as it does in salient domestic issues.
Analytical Framework: Parliaments as Sites of Politicization, the Changing Security Context, and Ideological Conflict

Parliaments and Politicization
Referring to a recent Special Issue on politicization of EU affairs, we 'posit that politicization can be empirically observed in (a) the growing salience of European {crisis management] governance, involving (b) a polarisation of opinion, and (c) an expansion of actors and audiences engaged in monitoring EU affairs [crisis management]' (de Wilde et al., 2016: 4) . As is shown below, these requirements were fulfilled in the case of crisis management in Finland. Parliaments and particularly plenary debates provide a fertile ground for politicization. Unlike committees that often meet behind closed doors, plenary debates are held in public, broadcast (at least online) live, with full verbatim accounts available. The presence of government ministers in the chamber facilitates media coverage, with opposition parties thus having stronger incentives to criticize the cabinet. Moreover, debates offer backbenchers, particularly those who need to signal their positions to the electorate, the chance to express their views and discomfort with the initiatives, even against the position of their own parties. While MPs may be 'whipped' into following the party line in voting, 'rebels' can still often take the floor to disagree with their party leaders (Proksch and Slapin, 2015; Bäck and Debus, 2016) .
From a normative perspective debates can even be considered the most important way in which legislatures contribute to security policy. The plenary provides a public forum for debate where the security policy choices are justified and explained (Lord, 2011) , especially when there are political parties offering alternatives and a healthy media covering the debates (Baum and Potter, 2015) . As argued in the introduction to this Special Issue, 'having parliaments debate security may well lead to a politicization of security which extends partisan politics beyond the water's edge. It can put the executive under pressure to justify its policies publicly and provide room for the opposition to test the government's arguments and seek public support for its own position. ' (Mello and Peters, 2017) But politicians themselves may have good reasons to favour less transparent, consensual modes of policy-making. MPs may defend meeting in camera with the need to ensure confidential exchange of information with the government, which in turn facilitates stronger parliamentary scrutiny of security policy. MPs may also believe that unity at home improves the bargaining position of the government or the morale of troops abroad. Overall, in security policy decision-makers often evoke notions of national unity and demand that the major political parties at least try to build consensus on these issues so that disunity at home does not undermine success abroad.
Importantly, parliamentary politicization can trigger stronger accountability of the government, especially if the issue divides opinion also inside cabinet parties. When faced with an assertive legislature, the government can buy its support through agreeing to procedures -such as reporting requirements or ex ante veto -that enhance oversight of the cabinet and parliamentary participation rights. Naturally the government itself may also benefit from such procedures, as ex ante parliamentary approval should facilitate support for the government in subsequent stages of policymaking. In crisis management missions this means that the legislature should be less critical during the operations when it has been consulted about the initial troop deployment -thus providing credibility to the country's international commitments (e.g. Martin, 2000) .
The New Security Context and the Empowerment of the Eduskunta
Finland certainly belongs to those countries where national unity is emphasized in security policy.
During the Cold War foreign policy was very much driven by the concept of neutrality: political debate and contestation on security policy were rare and maintaining amicable relations with the Soviet Union was a top priority. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Finland wasted no time becoming fully engaged in European integration, joining the EU in 1995.
Many voices questioned whether a neutral country with a long border with Russia could contribute meaningfully to European security integration. Calming such doubts is probably one of the reasons why Finland has actively supported the development of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (Jokela, 2011; Palosaari, 2011 The formulation of the grand strategy document, which outlines the core objectives and issues in security policy, provides an important channel for parliamentary influence in security policy. The report, titled since 1995 the Government Security and Defence Policy Report and published roughly every four years, provides an overall framework for subsequent foreign and security policy decisionmaking, including in crisis management. The government drafts the report, but the process is monitored by a parliamentary working group that brings together representatives from all Eduskunta parties, opposition included. In the Eduskunta the report is scrutinized carefully, with the Defence Committee (DEFC) submitting a statement to FAC which produces a report on the draft report.
Finally, the plenary debates and approves the final report.
Amendments to national peacekeeping legislation reflect the domestic constitutional reforms, the changing security context, and specifically the development of CSDP (Tiilikainen, 2008; Palosaari, 2011 The Eduskunta was involved in decision-making about peacekeeping operations already during the Cold War. Although the decision to participate in the Suez operation in the 1950s had been subject to a parliamentary debate, the rule whereby troops could be deployed only after having heard the opinion of the FAC was established in connection with a government bill for new peacekeeping legislation that was introduced in 1964 to enable Finland's participation in UNFICYP (United Nations Forces in Cyprus). In fact, this initial empowerment of the Eduskunta provides the first example of the effects of politicization, as the Cyprus operation produced controversy in the parliament and also active public debate. Most vocal critique was expressed by the predecessor of Left Alliance, the Finnish People's Democratic Union, but the issue was clearly salient also among the other parties. (Vesa, 2007: 526) However, the reforms introduced in the post-Cold War era have significantly changed both the legal framework and especially the broader participation rights of the parliament. Here one must emphasize the importance of the broader constitutional changes that provide a solid backbone for parliamentary engagement in security policy and crisis management. The Eduskunta has vigorously and successfully pushed for stronger ex ante and ex post accountability mechanisms. The government is the key actor, negotiating about operations abroad and planning Finnish participation. However, the president, as the commander-in-chief of the defence forces, has the final say about troop deployment, but the presidents have not contested the decisions. Essentially the Eduskunta and specifically the FAC are heard before the issue is decided in the cabinet. The same applies if the tasks of the Finnish personnel are significantly changed during the operation. 7 The law from 1995 introduced the possibility for 'extended peacekeeping', but also stipulated that consultation of FAC was needed in such instances.
According to the law from 2000, when international operations do not fulfill the conditions of traditional UN peacekeeping operations, whether in relation to their mandate or authorization to use force, the government must produce a report 8 to the plenary of the Eduskunta. The same applies if the duties of the Finnish personnel change significantly during the operation. In short, the FAC or the plenary is consulted before each operation and the Eduskunta receives regular reports on the operations, for example in the form of biannual crisis management overviews.
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To conclude, the Eduskunta is in the post-Cold War era actively involved in foreign and security policy, with the 'grand strategy' document and crisis management legislation in particular enabling the parliament to set constraints on subsequent policy choices, including participation in individual operations. Returning to the criteria of politicization, we have so far seen that instead of leaving such matters to the executive, parliamentary involvement has brought about 'an expansion of actors and audiences engaged in monitoring crisis management'. Peacekeeping or crisis management has also been definitely 'salient' in Finland, and as argued in the next sub-section, issue salience has only increased in the post-Cold War era which has also witnessed stronger 'polarisation of opinion'.
Decision-making Culture: Consensus or Ideological Conflicts?
According to previous literature party politics does matter in security policy, with 'hawks' more often found among right-leaning legislators and 'doves' on the left. In the U.S. context there is strong evidence of such a divide between Democrats and Republicans (e.g. Poole and Rosenthal, 1991; Milner and Tingley, 2015) . Wagner et al. (2017) In Finland, consensus on security policy has traditionally been strong. The post-Cold War foreign policy debates have focused on three inter-related questions: Russia, CSDP, and crisis management (Raunio, 2016) . Importantly, there are now overall much more debates about foreign and security policy, with also clearer differences between political parties. Overall, questions related to national security and defence remain very delicate and salient. While parliamentary culture in foreign and security policy remains quite consensual, the left-right cleavage structures often the discussions, with centre-left parties emphasizing a more comprehensive or broader approach to foreign affairs, including human rights and development policy, while centre-right parties are more against cuts to defence spending and more supportive of developing closer links with NATO -ideological differences which were already visible even during the Cold War era (Joenniemi, 1978) . There is thus more room for party-political differences, and in line with the third criterion of politicization, there is also increasing 'polarisation of opinion' regarding security policy and crisis management. As the concept of non-alignment and contributing to UN-led peacekeeping has framed much of the security policy debate, changes to that status quo are likely to be particularly contested. 
Empirical Analysis
The empirical section is divided into two parts. The first examines crisis management legislation and Six government reports on security and defence policy have been published since the mid-1990s -in 1995, 1997, 2001, 2004, 2009 and 2012. 12 In addition, a specific report on improving crisis management and humanitarian aid capabilities was published in 1996. Overall, 
Crisis management legislation and 'grand strategy' documents
Individual operations
Included in the data set are all operations that Finland has joined since 1995. However, Table 3 contains only those operations that were discussed in the Eduskunta. 13 For each operation, the analysis focuses on the decision to participate in the mission but also debates held in connection with subsequent government reports on the missions are examined. While individual operations and crisis management as a whole come up in various plenary debates and oral or written questions, the initial deployment debates are likely to be the most important and also ones where the debate is about the operation itself. In terms of party politics, the National Coalition, the Swedish People's Party, the Social Democrats, and after initial hesitance also the Centre Party, were overall supportive of the operations, including those led by NATO. Strongest support was shown throughout by the National Coalition. The Greens were also by and large in favour, but stressed the importance of civilian crisis management, a concern shared by several other parties, not least the Christian Democrats. The Finns Party has argued in favour of credible national defence, and much of its criticism of the operations was based on their costs, questioning whether expensive operations are needed. Again the most vocal criticism came from the Left Alliance. It is the only party represented in the Eduskunta that has consistently criticized those operations moving away from UN mandates and traditional peacekeeping. Those more critical of the operations, primarily but not exclusively from the left-wing parties, were also more active in defending parliamentary rights, particularly in terms of the Eduskunta receiving sufficient information from the government. While H1 is thus clearly confirmed by the analysis, H2 about the left-right cleavage receives more mixed support. The high number of speeches also indicates lack of unity within parties, and many of them, including the Left Alliance, are split over security and defence questions.
Conclusion
The causal argument in this article is that the legislature offers a site for politicization of security policy which in turn can trigger stronger parliamentary involvement in crisis management. Returning thus to the definition of politicization employed in this article, there was definitely 'growing salience' of crisis management in the 1990s, not least due to the changing security context and the associated move away from UN-authorized operations that had been a key dimension of national security policy.
There was also an 'expansion of actors and audiences' engaged in monitoring crisis managementboth through parliamentary involvement where the debates were not limited to a small circle of MPs and in the society at large, with relevant stakeholders contributing to the discussions that also received considerable media coverage. This period of politicization was genuinely significant, for it resulted in stronger participation rights for the Eduskunta and created a sense of 'ownership' among MPs towards crisis management. Moreover, it must be emphasized that already the initial involvement of the Eduskunta from the 1960s was driven by politicization. The timeline in Table 4 summarizes this trend towards stronger parliamentary engagement.
TABLE 4
Instead of 'polarisation of opinion', it is perhaps better to talk about overall politicization and diversity of opinion. To be sure, there was broad cross-party support for consolidating the role of the Eduskunta in crisis management decision-making as part of the overall parliamentarization of the political system, security policy included. However, the government bills and reports, particularly The findings are thus in line with Martin (2000: 201) , who argued that the executive may try to evade legislative constraints in one-off situations, whereas parliamentary engagement will be more institutionalized in stable and repeated forms of international cooperation. Source: Finnish National Election Study (FNES). * Excluding the opening statements from the minister and the committee chair. 
